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Abstract—The outbreak of viruses have necessitated contact
tracing and infection tracking methods. Despite various efforts,
there is currently no standard scheme for the tracing and
tracking. Many nations of the world have therefore, developed
their own ways where carriers of disease could be tracked and
their contacts traced. These are generalized methods developed
either in a distributed manner giving citizens control of their
identity or in a centralised manner where a health authority
gathers data on those who are carriers. This paper outlines some
of the most significant approaches that have been established
for contact tracing around the world. A comprehensive review
on the key enabling methods used to realise the infrastructure
around these infection tracking and contact tracing methods
is also presented and recommendations are made for the most
effective way to develop such a practice.
Index Terms—COVID-19, contact tracing, tracking, privacy,
GPS, Bluetooth, RFID, Wearables.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, the Wuhan area of China was the first
in the world to experience the spread of novel Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Zhou et al. [1] found that in two
hospitals in the area, of those who were discharged and had
died, 48% had a co-morbidity with hypertension (30%) and
coronary heart disease (8%) being the most common. It has
since spread to many regions of the world. Horton [2] states
that the Contain–Delay–Mitigate–Research strategy of the UK
government failed as they initially did not test every suspected
case, isolate, quarantine and trace their contacts. Scale of the
crisis is highlighted with a delay of over three months on non-
urgent surgeries [3], and where there are worries around the
mental health of those dealing with COVID-19 patients [4].
Heymann et al. [5] specifies that close monitoring is re-
quired in order to match public health approaches to their
social acceptance and stresses that there is a need of strong
communication methods for self protection, identification of
symptoms and seeking the treatment. The COVID-19 pan-
demic has necessitated a contact tracing system which can
be used to identify an infected individual, and then trace
the people who have been in contact with that person. This
provides ways to contain the spread of COVID-19 by iden-
tifying the infected cases and their contacts and enforcing
appropriate restriction of self-isolation or quarantine. It is
likely that a contact tracing system will require the support
of human contact tracers, thus making necessary the usage
of a mobile phone application because the mobile phones
are the only devices used frequently while supporting a wide
range of functionalities. The key aspects of a contract tracing
application are listed below:
• Centralised or distributed? A distributed infrastructure
allows users to determine the other people that they have
been in contact with, whereas a centralised approach uses
a central server to store location tracing information.
• Proximity based or GPS? This either involves using
Bluetooth methods to track whether a person has been in
close proximity to another person, or where GPS location
is stored for a user.
• Privacy-enhanced methods? This involves the methods
used to identify the user and their history of contacts.
• Open or closed source? An important aspect with
contact tracing is whether the methods are open source. If
this is the case, then it is extremely important if they can
be peer-reviewed and by whom. Within a closed source
system, there is the uncertainty that for the bugs to be
discovered, it usually takes longer periods of time while
the products are already commercially used.
Hellewell et al. [6] analysed how well contact tracing could
be used to suppress the spread of COVID-19. For this, they
used the reproduction number (R0), the delay from symptom
to isolation, contract tracing probability, transmission before
symptom offset, and the percentage of sub-clinical infections.
Privacy plays a vital role within a contact tracing infrastruc-
ture. One quote with [7] defines:
“Some of my patients were more afraid of being
blamed than dying of the virus"
-Lee Su-young, Psychiatrist at Myongji Hospital,
South Korea
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
describes the underlying contact-tracing technologies, while
Section III analyzes all the proposed methods. Section IV
discusses the DP-3T approach. Section V provides a view on
the range of attacks on contact tracing methods while Section
VI provides a critical analysis on the feasibility of creating
a privacy-preserving contact tracing application. Section VII
concludes the work.
II. UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY
The fast spread of COVID-19 throughout the world caused
by severe acute respiratory syndrome has made it an un-
precedented national health crisis [8]. It has brought health
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2services under colossal pressure and necessitates for novel
solutions to combat the spread. Contact tracing is one of the
crucial interventions that public health professionals rely on
in managing the early stages of disease outbreaks.
In the public health realm, the process of identifying an in-
fected patient, listing and following the people who may have
exposed themselves to the infection by coming into contact
with them is termed as contact tracing. The process is reckoned
to be an effective tool to prevent the spread of infection at a
faster rate through timely provision of appropriate care to these
people [9].
Despite proving to be very useful in preventing the spread
of a disease, the performance of conventional contact-tracing
techniques (interviewing each patient and contacting people
that have been exposed to the patient) is often inadequate in
urban areas and during disease peaks [10]. Germany was able
to hold off the disease for a few weeks by using manual contact
tracing and moving COVID-19-positive patients to quarantine
[11], but the effectiveness of contact tracing relies on the faster
growth of identified cases than the number of new infections
[12] which is not possible in manual tracing.
This limitation is stressed out by the exponential spread
of the disease enabled by a higher population density and
frequent movement of urban residents. Digital tools utilising
existing technologies to gather information on the spread, key
symptoms, and means the virus is employing to transfer are
reckoned to be an effective response. Contact tracing is one
of the key digital techniques that can not only enable the
authorities to keep a track of the viral spread but can also
play a pivotal role in identifying the potential carriers of the
virus due to coming in contact with an identified patient. 29
countries around the world are now using mobile data to help
with contact tracing COVID-19 cases [13].
This section summarises the communications standards and
methods that would best support the contact tracing approach
and options already progressing that may help us get further
faster.
A. Broadcast, selected broadcast, unicast and participatory
methods
The methods involved with COVID-19 tracing typically
split into: (a) crowd-sourced applications; (b) self-reporting
systems; (c) centralised contact tracing; and (d) decentralised
contact tracing. The importance of testing is underlined by
Beeching, who outlines [14]:
“Test, test, test” is the key to controlling the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its clinical manifesta-
tion, covid-19, according to the World Health Or-
ganisation. However, three months after notification
of the novel coronavirus infection in China, there
is inadequate access to appropriate diagnostic tests
globally and confusion among healthcare profession-
als and the public about prioritisation of testing and
interpretation of results.
Raskar et al. [7] reviewed the risks around contact-tracing
and defines the methods of broadcast, selected broadcast,
unicast, and participatory methods. With broadcasting, the
Fig. 1: Novel Coronavirus Infection in Hong Kong using
ArcGIS
governments share the location of those who have been proven
to be infected. Singapore and Hong Kong (Figure 1) have a
detailed map of infected cases, while South Korea uses SMS
messages about those who have tested positive.
With selective broadcasting, governments do not send out
the information to the public about carriers and send only to a
selected group, such as people within a geographical area. In
this case, users will register for location information, through
a specific App, or for their phone numbers. In this case, it
may only send you information related to a carrier being in a
certain location.
For unicast, people are informed when a carrier moves into
contact with another person. This method was used in China
for those who were suspected to be at risk. The message is then
targeted to the person that goes close to a suspected carrier.
Generally, it is poor in terms of privacy, and it requires detailed
surveillance of citizens.
In terms of citizen engagement, the methods of partici-
patory sharing is one of the strongest, as users share their
locations with a central authority. They may also share infor-
mation that allows others to understand the risks that they, and
others, face. Unfortunately, this method may be open to abuse
from fraudulent entities.
Raskar et al. [7] have also analysed the risks of these
methods in based on (Table I):
• Accuracy: In this, unicast method has the lowest risk.
• Adoption: In this, broadcast method has the lower risk.
• Privacy: In this, broadcast, selected broadcast and partic-
ipatory methods have the lower risk.
• Consent: In this, practices vary greatly. For participatory,
full consent is required.
• Systemic challenges: In this category we are dealing
with issues like: fraud and abuse, and the security of
information. The risks are considered high in all the
categories.
Contact tracing is seen to be a part of reducing the spread
of the COVID-19 disease, and many countries of the world
have moved to integrate technical solutions for contact tracing.
These methods are mainly Bluetooth-based where a Bluetooth
3TABLE I: Risks and challenges of contact-tracing technological approaches (reproduced from [7])
Intervention Broadcast Selected Broadcast Unicast Participatory PrivateKit
Accuracy Limited Limited High Limited High
Adoption High Medium Medium Low Medium
Privacy risks for
carriers Significant Moderate Moderate Significant Moderate to Low
Private risks for lo-
cal businesses Significant Significant Moderate Significant Moderate to Low
Privacy risks for
users Privacy-protected Privacy at risk No privacy Privacy protected Privacy protected
Privacy risks for
non-users
Privacy at risk if car-
riers are identified
Privacy at risk if car-
riers are identified
Privacy at risk if car-
riers are identified
Privacy at risk if car-
riers are identified
Privacy at risk if car-
riers are identified
Consent of carries Practices vary Practices vary
Practices vary, often
with little or no con-
sent
Full consent Full consent
Misinformation and
panic High risk Medium risk Medium risk High risk Medium risk
Security of informa-
tion Low-to-medium risk Low-to-medium risk High risk Low risk Low-to-medium risk
beacon is sent between Bob and Alice when they are within
a given proximity and for a minimum amount of exposure
time. At the core of these methods is whether the approach
is centralized (where those infected are matched on a central
server), or decentralized (where individuals can do their own
matching with full consent). Basically, there are three main
entities involved: Bob (who is infected), Alice (who is in
contact with Bob) and the HA (Health Authority), as shown
in Figure 2. We may also introduce Grace, the government
official, and Eve, the eavesdropper.
Within a centralized system, Bob and Alice are assigned
identifiers that the HA can match whenever Bob and Alice
are in contact. This is matched through a privacy-preserving
rolling ID which only the HA can match back to Bob and
Alice. Once matched, the HA can then inform Bob and Alice
that they have been in contract. In a decentralized system,
Bob and Alice send the rolling IDs they receive, and Bob can
identify that he has COVID-19. The HA can then keep an ID
resolver so that Alice can determine when she has been in
contact with Bob. In this way, the HA does not know about
the contact between Bob and Alice, but Alice will.
III. CONTACT TRACING APPS FOR COVID-19
Almost three quarters (72.6 %) of internet users will access
the web solely via their smartphones by 2025, which is equiv-
alent to nearly 3.7 billion people [15]. The proliferation of
mobile devices presents a new opportunity for overcoming the
challenges faced by conventional contact tracing techniques
in terms of identifying, monitoring and informing about the
spread of a pathogen in densely populated areas, as is the case
with COVID-19. A famous example is China, which relied on
an elaborate surveillance architecture to actively monitor the
location of its citizens using live data and mobility history
to enforce self-isolation and conduct contact-tracing. Several
other countries, like Korea, Singapore, Israel, Iran, and Russia
[16], have built solutions around the Chinese model. However,
these attempts have led to criticisms on privacy and data
protection.
A variety of different groups around the globe are working
on the same lines to develop a contact tracing app. The fol-
lowing subsections outline some of the key technologies either
defined by organisations, country or geographical region.
A. Apple and Google
Apple and Google have worked together to create an API
integration for Bluetooth to track physical proximity between
phones. If someone later receives a positive COVID-19 di-
agnosis, they can report it through the App, and any users
who have been in recent contact with the infected person
will receive a notification. The system is Bluetooth-only, fully
opt-in, collects no location data from users, and no data
at all from anyone without a positive COVID-19 diagnosis.
Apple and Google chose perhaps the most privacy-friendly
of the many different schemes that could allow automated
smartphone contact tracing [17].
The Apple/Google method works by Bob generating a
unique 256-bit tracing key for his phone — and where this
key must be kept secret (Figure 3). Every day he then creates
a daily tracing key (diagnosis key), by creating a hash from
the tracing key and the current day. From this hash, it should
not be possible to determine his tracing key (as it is generated
from the random 256-bit tracing key). Every 10 minutes, he
creates a rolling ID key which is an HMAC identifier (a signed
hash) of his daily tracing key and a counter for the number of
10 minutes that have passed that day.
When Alice comes into contact with Bob, she will receive
her rolling ID through a Bluetooth Advertisement, and could
then pass that back to the Health Authority (HA). The HA
cannot correlate Bob from the rolling ID, and whether he has
COVID-19 or not. Alice is just blindly sending it back to Trent,
in order for the HA to track the contact or not. In order to
preserve privacy, the HA should only track if Alice has been
proven to be COVID-19 positive.
Once Bob has been proven to have COVID-19, he will send
the daily tracing key to the HA, who can then match all the
rolling ID keys to his identity. This will only happen for one
day. As he must send these keys every day, the key feature on
the phone will make the decision to send the key daily or not.
To enhance security, this design has been updated to integrate
AES encryption.
4Fig. 2: Basic model of contact tracing
Fig. 3: Google/Apple ID tracing
5Fig. 4: Covid.joinzoe.com
B. The United Kingdom
In the UK, KCL, Guys and St Thomas’ Hospitals in
partnership with ZOE Global Ltd have proposed C-19 COVID
Symptom Tracker [18]. The data is collected through daily
self-reporting of a volunteer user and analysed by machine
learning and data science methodologies to predict high-risk
areas in the UK while understanding symptoms, and the
propagation of the virus. However, the specific application is
not widely being adopted because it does not offer any real-
time tracing.
Susan Major [19] defines that around 700,000 people in-
stalled the COVID Symptom Tracker app (covid.joinzoe.com)
within the first day of its release (Figure 4). The research
team are critical that the current focus is on deaths rather
than tracking the spread of the disease in the percentage of
the population who were symptomatic (estimated between
5% and 60%). The App includes information related to age,
sex, height, weight, and postcode and lists any chronic health
conditions. Along with this users are asked about their current
symptoms including whether they have a fever, persistent
cough, unusual fatigue, shortness of breath, diarrhoea, confu-
sion, disorientation or drowsiness, and loss of appetite. Those
reporting symptoms are then sent a home testing kit, and where
the data received is then used to report whether they have
COVID-19 or not. All of the data collected is anonymised
and will be provided back - free of charge - to researchers.
Babylon COVID-19 Care Assistant is developed by Babylon
Health (a private healthcare provider) [20]. It is a separate
section of an existing Artificial Intelligence (AI) based App.
As an existing user logs in, they are asked at the beginning
of the triage if they are concerned about coronavirus. If they
answer yes, they are diverted to the COVID-19 triage, which
follows the same criteria of NHS111. The NHS representative
provides people with updated information about coronavirus,
allows them to log their symptoms, helps them get appropriate
assistance and advice to help them with not spreading the virus
wider. The App includes a live chat run by clinical support
staff and overseen by doctors.
The UK government developed an NHSX App based on
Low Energy Bluetooth. Once installed, the App allowed the
logging of the encrypted information of the users operating in
the close proximity of the host into a database [21]. A COVID-
19 positive case would lead to the App alerting everyone who
was noted to be in the vicinity of the detected user. Within
the NHSX App, we use elliptic curve cryptography, and use
a off-line key exchange method known as ECIES (Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme). As illustrated in Figure
5, Bob receives an InstallationID, the public key of the HA
(PubKeyS) and a symmetric key from the HA. Every day he
then creates a daily public key pair:
DailyPriv = r (1)
DailyPub = rG (2)
Where r is a random value and G is the base point on the
chosen elliptic curve. Using the public key of the HA and
his own daily private key (r), Bob generates a secret value
(Z). This value can also be regenerated at the HA with the
private key of the server (PrivS) and Bob’s daily public key
(rG). From Z, Bob generates the encryption key which will
protect the InstallationID for Bob. The symmetric key passed
is used to sign for the Bluetooth beacon. Finally, Bob adds his
daily public key to the beacon. This public key will be used to
regenerate the secret value (Z) at the HA, and thus generate the
same encryption key. Figure 6 outlines the decryption process
using Bob’s daily public key and the HA’s private key.
The approach is thus centralised, and where Bob’s identity
is created by the HA, and then matched back. One possible
weakness is where the private key of the HA is leaked, and
which will allow all of the derived keys to be generated.
Along with this, Bob’s public key will be exposed for a day
(rather than 10 minutes in the case of the Apple/Google contact
tracing method). It could thus be possible to trace Bob for one
day by monitoring his Bluetooth beacons and matching his
daily public key. After trails on the Isle of Wright, the App was
found to be good at determining distances between devices, but
it only found 4%of Apple devices and 75% of Android devices
[22]. This led to cancellation of the centralised approach, and
a move towards the hybrid approach.
BeepTrace [23] is a blockchain-enabled fully distributed
privacy-preserving solution for COVID-19 contact tracing.
in this approach, blockchain is adopted to bridge the user/-
patient and the authorised solvers to desensitize the user
ID and location information. Compared with the dominating
active mode that adopts Bluetooth or similar technologies
to exchange information among contacted users, BeepTrace
proposes a passive model by using GPS or similar without
direct information exchange at the end user side.
C. The European Union
The European Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity
Tracing Initiative (PEPP-PT) proposes an open source Blue-
tooth based platform sharing software, standards and services
that can be utilised for the development of COVID-19 contact
tracing Apps. Each national health authority can tweak the
software according to its own policies and processes. The
software aims at measuring proximity data and alerting the
traced contacts of a user if detected positive to COVID-19
6Fig. 5: ECIES Encryption with the NHSX App
Fig. 6: Decrypting Bob’s ID with the NHSX App
7while adhering to privacy. As an EU initiative, it has a wide
approach across national borders [24].
One of the methods that has been published which tries
to address this balance is Pan-European Privacy Preserving
Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT). With this, a device requests
and ID from the tracking service (Trent) and is given a one-
time anonymised ID (and which includes an obfuscation of the
country ID). It then use Bluetooth beacons and possibly Wi-
Fi to discover and identify neighbours. The method defined
in PEPP-PT then uses the signal strength method to estimate
the distance someone is away. Note that this is not a GPS
tracking method and will just give a circular radius around
a person, and possibly amount of time that they were near
another phone.
The users must install the tracking application on their
phone — possibly they must be forced to do this by their
government — and then it will be used to track contacts
between one phone and another.
The results are then sent back to Trent with a device identi-
fier for Alice’s phone (possibly the Bluetooth MAC address).
If the device is a registered device with an anonymous ID, it
will send back its neighhour’s ID and an estimation of location,
and also store this as in the history log.
Overall, there is no personal information stored, and the
device just stores anonymised IDs. The history is then deleted
when there is a test that the user of the device does not have
SARS-Cov-2, but remains encrypted until there is a test to
prove that they do not have the virus.
If the user has been proven to have it, the health authority
registers the device with a TAN code, and with consent, they
register onto a tracking system, and where they allow others
they have been in contact with to be alerted to the possible
threat of infection. There is no personal information stored.
If the phones are from different countries (identified in the
anonymous ID), there is an alert send to the health care
provider in the other country.
D. DP-3T
The DP-3T is decentralised and open sourced [25]. It
involves a collaboration of eight different countries. It general
defines a number of objectives:
• Anonymous identifier donation. This uses a short-term
anonymous identifier (ID) and includes a measure of the
Bluetooth signal strength.
• Logging the proximity history. This only stores proximity
information when within an epidemiologically sufficient
proximity. No geo-location information is stored.
• Usage of the proximity history. The data is stored in an
encrypted form if the user has not been tested, or is clear.
When tested positive, the Health Authority contacts the
user, and provides a TAN code, and where the user then
consents to reveal their history.
• Country-dependent trust service operation. If the phones
are from different countries (identified in the anonymous
ID), there is an alert send to the health care provider in
the other country.
E. France
In France, Covidom App is developed to monitor COVID-
19 patients who have been through Paris hospitals and ei-
ther identified as COVID-19-positive or suspected of being
infected) but do not require hospitalization but are staying at
home [26]. The application is based on a daily digital online
questionnaire asking the patient about their respiration, heart
rate and temperature. Depending on the response of the patient,
the healthcare team is alerted and contacts the patient to adapt
the follow-up and treatment. The app is voluntary and does
not have any real time contact tracing capability.
F. Poland
In Poland, Home Quarantine App is developed and endorsed
by the Government. Its use is mandatory for 14 days to
people returning to Poland from abroad and for those who
are COVID-19-positive [27]. The app is based on Instagram
and require the people to upload their selfies within 20 min-
utes of receiving an alert. Instagram’s geolocation and facial
recognition capabilities are used to ensure that the people are
adhering with self-quarantine.
G. Germany
Germany has Corona Data Donation App that gathers
the vital signs (pulse, temperature, sleep) of volunteers and
analyse the probability of testing positive for COVID-19
using wearable technology [28]. An online interactive map is
generated based on this information to depict the geographical
spread of the virus.
H. Russia
The Russian Social Monitoring App tracks the self-isolated
COVID-19 patients’ whereabouts through user’s calls, loca-
tion, camera, storage, network information and other data [29].
I. China
In China, Health Code App - developed by the Government,
WeChat and Alipay - tracks people’s symptoms and issues
real-time individual health status, using a three-colour scheme
(Green, Yellow, and Red) [30]. Real-time location and trac-
ing based on GPS, existing WeChat/Alipay payment system,
mobile network and traffic data with advanced machine learn-
ing/big data analytic is employed to enable accurate detection
and fast alerting. The app usage is compulsory and may
lead to potential data/privacy issues as well as discriminating
behaviours based on colour schemes.
J. South Korea
In South Korea, Corona 100m (Co100) App allows those
who have been ordered not to leave home to stay in contact
with case workers and report on their progress [31]. The App
uses GPS to keep track of infected people’s location to make
sure they are not breaking their quarantine. It also alerts users
when they come within 100 metres of a location visited by
an infected person. Machine learning/data science tools are
8however not used to track/trace travel history and make real-
time alerts to the public. The app is not mandatory, and a user
can opt out.
South Korea’s Ministry of Interior has also introduced a
mandatory GPS based Self-quarantine Safety Protection App
to support officials to monitor citizens in quarantine [32]. An
alert is sent to both patient and case worker, if the patient
leaves their quarantine zone. Citizens can self-report their
symptoms.
K. Singapore
Singapore have introduced TraceTogether, a Bluetooth
based App that traces and identifies those who have been
exposed to a COVID-19 infected person [33]. The scan history
is stored locally. The participation is voluntary, and no real-
time alerting and tracing is available. TraceTogether uses
Bluetooth and keeps a track of all the contacts made within a
21-day period [34]. It only stores contacts and not the actual
locations of the phone. If the Ministry of Health requires the
contact history, they ask the user for consent to share it. The
logs are encrypted on the device, and only decrypted once
the logs are uploaded to the Department of Health. Contract
tracers then use the logs to match to those who the user
has been in contact with. Bluetooth was selected due to the
inability of GPS to locate accurately within buildings (as the
GPS methods on phones only estimate within buildings).
L. India
In India, AarogyaSetu App uses GPS and Bluetooth to track
the people who have symptoms and identify people who have
been in close proximity to them [35]. The participation is
voluntary, and the location and contact history stay on the
device unless a user is COVID-19 infected in which case the
person’s data is sent to the cloud. The app traces travel/contact
history but no real-time alerting is available.
COVID-19 Quarantine Monitor Tamil Nadu App is also an
Indian initiative that tracks a quarantined user. The voluntary
used app enables live location tracking via GPS and generates
alerts [36]. The Apps in India have no underlying legal
framework for privacy protections in place.
M. The USA
In the USA, MIT developed Safe Paths App, which uses
Bluetooth to track users and share locations between them
[37]. Safe Paths collects users’ location data, keeping a time-
stamped log every five minutes and is encrypted and stored
locally. In total, 28 days of data can be stored in the app
in under 100 kilobytes of space (that’s less storage space
than a single photo takes up). If a user is tested positive
for COVID-19, they can share this data to health official by
using a QR code, thereby facilitating contact-tracing [38]. It
also compares recent locations against the path of an infected
person and alerts them of potential contact. SafePaths uses
Bluetooth tracing and GPS methods [39]. Figure 7 outlines
that SafePaths has strong methdods of data privacy and data
utility [7].
Fig. 7: Data Privacy and Data Utility
With SafePaths, the server limits clients to N location points
per exchange, and also limits the number of queries that a
client can request every day. This stops an adversary mapping
out a whole geographical area with continual requests.
How We Feel App developed by Pinterest with the help
from Harvard, Stanford, MIT, University of Maryland, Weill
Cornell and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, gathers
the data on user’s health, age and zip code (information like
name, phone number or email is not collected). The data is
then aggregated and shared with researchers, public health
professionals and doctors [40].
MIT is developing a Bluetooth based Private Automatic
Contact Tracing App, where individuals enable their phone
to continuously send out random data strings and keep a log
of those from other participating devices it has encountered
[41]. When a user is diagnosed with COVID-19, they would
receive a QR code notifying a cloud system of their status.
All other participants in the system would be able to scan the
collective logs and would be warned of a potential (but still
anonymous) COVID-19 contact.
The US Health Weather Map App is created by Kinsa
Insights and Oregon State University. It is currently being
used to track typical illness levels such as self-reported fevers
(Figure 8). This type of application could be used to crowd
source population health information, and on a scale that
public health authorities would struggle with.
N. Iran
The Iranian Ministry of Health developed a contact tracing
App requiring the user to register using his mobile number.
The App uses GPS data to identify the user’s location. It
also requests permission for identifying the user’s activity and
shares the self-declared attributes of the user with the server
including gender, name, height, and weight [42]. Though
removed from the Google Play Store, the App is still available
from other application stores [43].
9Fig. 8: Fever map in the US
O. Israel
The ‘Hamagen’ App from Israel’s Health Ministry collects
location history of the user using GPS in the background
and compares the user’s movement with the health ministry’s
data. If a user has come in close contact with a COVID-
19-positive user, an alert is sent to the user directing them
to a website containing details on further actions. Though
it is stressed that all the information is stored on the user’s
smartphone, the App comes alongside controversial temporary
powers granted to Shin Bet security agency allowing them to
track the movements of smartphones users via their devices
and sending alerts to those who may have been exposed to
COVID-19 being in contact with a confirmed infected user
[44].
P. Australia
The Australian government has launched a Bluetooth based
contact tracing App COVIDSafe. The voluntary participation
registers a user with name, age range, postcode and phone
number. The system creates a unique encrypted reference code
for the user. When the App recognises another device having
the COVIDSafe App, it notes the date, time, distance and
duration of the contact and the other user’s reference code in
the form of encrypted data in the user’s phone [45]. When
a user is detected as COVID-19-positive, this App data is
acquired by the health officials who the send the alerts of
possible exposure to the people traced as being in contact with
that user.
Q. EPIC
The EPIC contact tracing system uses homomorphic encryp-
tion in matching users up for possible contacts in a defined
time window [46]. First, Alice defines data in time stamps
and stores homomorphically encrypted timestamps for her
location:
E(TIME1)a E(Location1)a
E(TIME2)a E(Location2)a
E(TIME3)a E(Location2)a
Where E(TIMEx)a is the homomorphically encrypted times-
tamp value, and E(Locationx)a is the homomorphically en-
crypted location information. Then, Alice and Bob upload
their homomorphically encrypted time stamp and location
information to the HA (Health Authority), who stores these
values:
E(TIME1)a E(Location1)a
E(TIME2)a E(Location2)a
E(TIME3)a E(Location2)a
E(TIME1)b E(Location1)b
E(TIME2)b E(Location2)b
E(TIME3)b E(Location2)b
The HA cannot tell either the time stamp or the location
information. Alice is now identified as having COVID-19,
and the server can identify her encrypted values and runs
a homomorphic difference on the timestamps and location
(Figure 9).
Here the HA cannot tell where Bob and Alice were and
at what time, but they can tell that there was a match for a
one-second difference and if they were one metre away from
each other. In this way, Bob could be informed of a possible
infection. Other information too is stored which can be used
for the matching process, such as the device type, the SSID of
the wireless access point that they connected to, and the RSSI
(Received Signal Strength Indication), as shown in Figure 10.
R. TraceSecure
In TraceSecure [47], the authors proposed two private
contact tracing methods using Bluetooth signals. The first one
extends the TraceTogether application [39] by integrating a
secure message-based protocol, while the second one incor-
porates a public key infrastructure that elaborates additive
homomorphic encryption.
S. Cryptographic Preservation of Privacy
Another approach based on GPS location data that in-
corporates strong encryption techniques, such as Private Set
Intersection (PSI), has also been developed [48]. The goal
was the development of an infrastructure that not only pro-
motes stronger privacy guarantees than the methods being
adopted from the governments, but also feasible practically.
However, the performance overhead of a technique like this is
being questioned [47].Though the Epione [49] solution uses
lightweight cryptography to provide strong privacy, a real-
world implementation has not been developed yet.
IV. KEY ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
Location data is pivotal to any contact tracing solution.
These solutions are based on the assumption that if two
persons have shared a close proximity, they have contacted
with each other. Artificial Intelligence based technologies such
as facial recognition can be employed to reduce the number
of false positives however; their limited availability restricts
their usage. On the other hand, universal usage of mobile
devices, smartphones and internet, GPS, Bluetooth beacons,
Wi-Fi, telecom cell towers and social media can be effectively
used to collect the user’s location data. GPS, Wi-Fi routers
and cell towers provide absolute location data in the form of
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Fig. 9: Google/Apple ID tracing
Fig. 10: Signal strength
geolocation coordinates while Bluetooth pairing gives relative
location data in the form of some reference description of the
location, for example, both persons shared the same bus [50].
Bluetooth tracing has emerged as the most suitable method
for contact tracing in the backdrop of COVID-19 [51]. How-
ever, it has its own deficiencies that limits its capabilities.
Methods such as private messaging for notifications of possible
contacts after collecting Bluetooth IDs [39], use of geolocation
information [52], using Wi-Fi access, cellular network usage,
social media, radio frequency identification and wearable de-
vices have the potential to be used as contact tracing enablers.
It is also possible to use smartphone built-in sensors such
as gyroscope and magnetometer to correlate similar locations
without revealing the actual coordinates where they occurred
[53].
Contact tracing solutions does not have a uniform system
architecture. Whilst countries rush to deploy the contact trac-
ing apps, they raise a multitude of privacy and data protection
issues. In this section, we discuss the technologies that can be
effectively used to carry out contact tracing in the backdrop
of COVID-19.
A. Real Time Location Systems (RTLS)
RTLS refers to any system that accurately determines an
item or person’s location. RTLS is not a specific type of system
or technology, but rather is a goal that can be accomplished
with a variety of systems for locating and managing assets.
An important aspect of RTLS is the time at which users are
tracked, and this data can be used in different ways depending
on the application. For example, some applications only need
timestamps when a user passes through an area, while other
RTLS applications require much more granular visibility, and
entail that time data be updated constantly. An ideal RTLS
can accurately locate, track, and manage assets, inventory, or
people and help authorities to make knowledgeable decisions
based on collected location data. RTLS is used across many
industries including manufacturing, mining and healthcare
industry.
All RTLS applications will consist of a few basic com-
ponents including a transponder, a receiver, and software to
interpret the data. The complexity of the system, chosen
technology, and scope of the application will determine the
amount of hardware and software required to create the ideal
RTLS.
• Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS): Ever-
growing demand of navigation and positioning facilities
to be available in portable devices has made the GNSS an
essential part of the modern communication applications,
especially the mobile phones. A Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) adoption to enhance the provision of
emergency services by tracking a user’s location through
his mobile also necessitates the integration of the GPS
to the cellular phones [54]. The usage of GNSS for
navigation-enabled smartphones is predicted to rise to
6.5 billion in 2020 [55].
GNSS facilitates innovative tracking solutions, including
the deployment of local geofences that trigger an alarm
when a user leaves the perimeter. Global Positioning
System (GPS) delivers the navigation and positioning
services world-wide being the only fully functional
satellite navigation system at present. The navigation
systems are based on a fundamental positioning
procedure where knowing the distance from an unknown
location to a certain number of known locations, allows
finding the coordinates of the unknown position. In
the GPS, a number of satellites orbiting the earth
provide the known locations while the position of the
user on earth with a receiver is the unknown location [56].
To determine 3-D position of the receiver, the principle
of triangulation is used through the measurements of
time delay between transmission and reception of each
GPS radio signal transmitted by the GPS satellites. The
distance between the user and the satellite is calculated
from this time delay as the speed of signal (equals to the
speed of light) is already known. The GPS signals also
carry information about the location of the satellites. By
determining the position of, and distance to at least three
satellites, the GPS receiver can compute its position
in terms of latitude, longitude and height (Figure 11).
However, a fourth satellite is also required for a timing
offset that occurs between the clock in the receiver and
those in the satellites due to poor synchronisation. Using
the data from the fourth satellite, the receiver can find
this timing offset and hence can eliminate it [56], [57],
[58], [59].
GPS localisation is a fundamental tool in identifying
the location of a smartphone user. By maintaining the
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Fig. 11: GPS Position calculation using triangulation
Fig. 12: Active GPS tracking
database of geolocation information, people whose
devices were in the same area in a certain time duration
can easily be found. In the context of COVID-19, a
user’s mobility history could be maintained for the last
14 days and securely stored on a restricted cloud server.
Mobile phones whose owners have tested positive would
be flagged on the app, and big data analytics would
be used to determine which other phones have been in
the proximity of that positive case within the historic
window. Targeted messages could then be sent to phones
that came in close contact, advising owners on whether
to seek self-isolation or medical help. There would be
minimal need for personal information as only the GPS
location of the phone is required to identify the risk
of exposure. Location and GPS data would also help
officials to build maps of “transmission zones” that
could paint a picture of how and where the disease is
spreading Figure 12).
GPS tracking however is a significant drain on mobile
phone batteries and is not accurate enough as GPS-
enabled smartphones are typically accurate to within a
4.9 meter caused by signal blockage due to buildings,
bridges, trees, etc., indoor or underground use and
multipath reflection. Privacy is also another issue that
restricts the wide usage of GPS for public location
tracking. Another concern is spoofing attacks where a
spoofer creates a false GPS signal with an incorrect time
and location to a particular receiver [60].
• Bluetooth: Contact tracing apps leveraging Low-power
Bluetooth Communication (LBC) passively collect
information about surrounding Bluetooth IDs by doing
regular scans [46]. The user grants the app access
to the phone’s Bluetooth, which it uses to search for
nearby Bluetooth devices (within 5-10 metre range).
The phone then stores the list of Bluetooth devices it
has encountered. Traditionally, a centralized approach is
adopted where scans of individuals are uploaded to a
central server database administered by health officials.
Each scan includes the information of control flags,
adjacent node ID, contact start time, contact end time
and distance (discretized to ‘Close’, ‘Medium’, and ‘Far’
based on received signal strength indicator (RSSI) value)
from the near contact. Pairwise matching scores between
user data and the database are regularly calculated to
identify contacts, whom a given user has been close to
in the past 14 days.
If a user turns COVID-19-positive, the list of Bluetooth
devices encountered can be fetched, and the owners
advised on whether to get tested or go into self-isolation.
Additionally, Bluetooth beacons could be placed at
specific locations such as grocery stores or in train
coaches to determine which phones have visited those
locations (at a specific date and time) [61]. This system
can also alert venue managers to close or carry out a
general sanitisation of the location/venue if a severe
case or cluster of cases are identified [62]. Bluetooth
addresses some disadvantages of GPS and expands the
usability of the app with further qualities, as shown in
Figure 13.
Systems using Bluetooth communication for automatic
contact tracing has been first proposed by Altuwaiyan
et al. in 2018 [46]. However there are challenges to
be addressed: Firstly apps like TraceTogether [33],
that works on similar idea of exploiting LBC for
contact tracing are prone to information leakage due
to centralized architecture; Secondly, the range of
Bluetooth is more than 1.5 meters and can penetrate
through walls, hence people in different rooms and
behind other obstacles may also be regarded as being
in contact generating false positives as shown in Figure
14. Bluetooth addresses some disadvantages of GPS and
expands the usability of the app with further qualities, as
shown in Figure 14. The effectiveness of Bluetooth-based
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Fig. 13: Local detection via Bluetooth
approach however depends on the massive adaptability
of the App [63] and slow or low rate of adoption reduces
its usefulness [60].
The privacy concerns can be addressed by incorporating
cryptographic techniques to generate random keys and
use them instead of phone ids’ which are not just
anonymous, but pseudonymous, constantly changing
their ‘ID,’ and that cannot be tracked back to an
individual [64]. These contact-tracing keys will sit on
your device, rather than in a centralised server. Moreover
peer-to-peer decentralized contact tracing mechanisms
[51] can be incorporated using distributed hash tables
that makes use of blind signatures to ensure messages
about infections are authentic and remain unchanged.
Although Bluetooth can, with its wide range, detect
another phone in its vicinity but cannot pinpoint which
direction the contact is coming from. Ultra-wide band
chips [65] in the latest smart phones can help since
it is possible to determine how close a person is by
sending billions of pulses across a wide range of
frequencies. However, the limitation is that not many
phones have UWB (ultra-wideband) chips and they can
only communicate with each other.
• Wi-Fi Router Tracing: Wi-Fi currently carries more
than 60% of the world’s Internet traffic [66]. Smartphone
based localization methods employing wireless signals
such as WiFi enjoy more popularity due to the use
of off-the-shelf internal sensors, and relatively low
cost [67]. Ubiquity of Wi-Fi access through massive
deployment of WiFi routers can be exploited to gain
the knowledge of a user’s mobility data. These mobility
traces are unique and identify the users accurately giving
information about home and work locations, visited
places, and personality traits [68], [69]. High-resolution
mobility patterns of entire social systems can perform an
important role to ensure social distancing and combat the
spread of epidemics including COVID-19 on multiple
scales [70], [71], [72], [73].
When a smartphone user is within the range of a publicly
available Wi-Fi and wishes to use it, it transmits a probe
request to the router containing its globally unique Media
Access Control (MAC) address. The router assigns a
unique IP address to the user and maintain an entry
into the Dynamic Host Client Protocol (DHCP) table.
Most of the providers also ask for additional information
such as name, email, location tracking, etc. to use it for
business adverts. Using RSSI (Received Signal Strength
Indication), MAC address, personal information and
timestamps for the probe request of a user, the router
can easily generate a WiFi signal map detecting the
location of a user and duration of his presence based
on the services used (Figure 15). Cross referencing and
basic analysis of logs from various routers will enable
tracking in the locations a user visited, how long he
spent in a specific area and how fast he moved from
place to other. The average coverage range of the Wi-Fi
is 80 meters outdoors and 50 meters indoors, limiting
positioning to 4-15 meters. A combination of Wi-Fi
with GPS is being used by Google, Apple, Microsoft,
Skyhook, etc. to improve positioning [69].
The mobility data of an app user who self-diagnoses
would identify the locations they have visited and people
who have been in the vicinity (using the same router
for Wi-Fi access). An alert would then be generated to
advise these people to self-isolate.
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID): RFID is
one of the major identification technologies used
today covering almost every aspect of our daily life.
Applications of this electromagnetic waves-based
identification method include access to buildings and
transportation, animal tracking, patient monitoring,
personal identification, facilitating the inventory and
shipping of goods, assembly lines and supply chains,
tagging food and retail items, localization, and even
providing assistance for visually impaired persons [74],
[75], [76].
RFID technology has accomplished a major development
in the last decade, mainly due to the reduction in the cost
of RFID chips and huge developments in microelectronics
and RF domains. Figure 16 illustrates a typical RFID
System that comprises of a set of remote transponders
known as RFID tags, and an RFID reader. RFID tags
include an antenna and an application specific integrated
circuit (ASIC) also known as a chip, containing the data
about the tagged object. The RFID reader generates a
query signal towards the RFID tags and the tag replies
back with data. The Readers are usually connected
with some embedded systems, host computers having
application software to collect and share data.
The passive Ultra High Frequency (UHF) tags typically
consist of three elements; (1) transponder (packed in
ASIC or simply an RFID chip); (2) antenna; and (3)
dielectric substrate. Passive tags are usually very simple
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Fig. 14: Proximity and not-in-proximity scenarios in Bluetooth contact tracing
Fig. 15: WiFi contact tracing approach
devices (Figure 6) and therefore, much cheaper (typically
costing around $0.10) than other types of radio devices.
Passive tags do not require maintenance and have a long
life, which is limited by the degradation of the label
material rather than the use of batteries. Passive tags
are expected to be readable for 10 to 20 years in many
environments [77], [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84],
[85].
UHF RFID uses passive tags attached to the smartphones
and objects. It enables tracking of location of COVID-19
patient as well as items touched/used by him through
Real Time Location Systems. The RFID reader antenna
with beam steering capability will be used to read
tag angle and RSSI, the tag proximity with other tags
will be estimated by applying signal processing and
machine learning techniques. RFID reader antenna will
also not interfere with other RFID readers behind the
walls/obstacle. A hybrid of Bluetooth and RFID can
therefore be used to mitigate the drawbacks of Bluetooth
and improve the accuracy (Figure 17). The hybrid
technique also has significant privacy advantages over
GPS-based location-tracking.
• UWB 5G Positioning: 5G networks use large antenna
arrays and ultra-wide bandwidths (UWB). They enable
a decimetre level accuracy in location systems. Unlike
other positioning technologies such as GPS, Bluetooth or
WiFi, UWB technology uses RF signal’s Time Difference
of Arrival (TDOA) or Time of Flight to estimate the
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Fig. 16: Key components in a typical RFID system
Fig. 17: Reading the proximity of RFID tags using UHF RFID technology with beam steerable antennas
distance between target and reference base station, that
provides more accuracy with much more precise range
measurement as shown in Figure 18. However, these
systems are not yet fully operational.
B. Mobile Network Tracing
Mobile network operators already hold information on sub-
scriber location and mobility history, albeit the resolution of
the subscriber localisation is only down to the base station
level. However, with the growing trend of small cells covering
urban centres and the implementation of Artificial Intelligence
techniques, this mode of tracing could be efficient and useful.
This solution involves using mobile network information and
radio control signals to get the user’s location and mobility
history, as shown in Figure 19. This information can be used
for high-level epidemiological studies to determine the spread
of the disease especially after crowded events such as religious
gatherings, parties, concerts or sporting events (likely to open
gradually after the lock-down is progressively relaxed). Text
messages will be sent to subscribers asking them to opt out if
they do not wish to participate.
Fig. 18: Difference between accuracy of 5G UWB and other
positioning systems
C. Crowd Sourcing of Social Media
Social media analytic can be expanded by fusing together
additional data sources such as License Plate Recognition
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Fig. 19: Contact tracing using network information
(LPR), smart city CCTV, ATM transactions and credit card
purchases, to help recreate the possible corona virus exposure
path [86], [87], [88], [89]. Leveraging graph database and
graph inference algorithms, we can model complex interac-
tions of individuals/group of individuals by linking and cor-
relating information from heterogeneous digital data sources
(online activity and check-ins, ATM transactions and LPR to
detect visited locations, geolocation information inferred from
mobile phone data or WIFI tracing) [90]. In these types of
specialized databases, people, places, and things are treated as
“nodes” and the connections between them are called “edges”
that makes up the COVID-19 contact network. These networks
consisting of nodes and edges make it possible to illuminate
collected knowledge clearly, to uncover connections and to
recognize patterns, and graph analytic can be used to detect
contacts of infected people (clusters). A contact network is not
necessarily a social network, since contacts might be family,
friends, acquaintances, or strangers. We can pick up a disease
from a sick family member at home or from a stranger via an
inopportune sneeze in a crowded coffee shop.
Human networks evolve into what social scientists call
“small-world networks” - we tend to cluster together via the
social dynamic of hemophilia (i.e. birds of a feather flock
together). A small-world network is made up of connected
clusters where there are more connections within the cluster
than between the clusters. Shortest path algorithms can also
be used to trace infection paths across multiple contact points
within clusters, thus revealing disease pathways. Identifying
‘super-spreaders’ or super-spreading events among the infected
patients can be conveniently studied and visualized from a
graph network perspective. Two-mode network approach [87]
can be adopted to create COVID-19 contact network such as
shown in Figure 20, consisting of different layers, personal
and geographical which emphasizes the relationships between
other individuals and their visits to high-risk locations. This
would enable proximity tracking of all the other individual/-
group of individuals who are most likely be in contact with
the carrier or are present in the same time and space.
D. Wearable Devices
Wearable devices enable mobile computing and wireless
networking and collect data, track activities, and provide cus-
tomized experiences to the user’s needs and desires. Wearable
technology has successfully moved past the adoption stage
and now stands at the brink of massive diversification with
an explosion in popularity and applicability. Wearable devices
have found applications in almost every aspect of our daily
life including consumer electronics, healthcare, sports and
fitness, enterprise and industry, media and entertainment [91].
Smart glasses, smart watches, wristbands, fitness and health
trackers, smart clothing and smart jewellery are the most
popular wearable devices. The global market of the wearable
technology was estimated at $24.6 billion in 2019 and is
expected to hit the $38.41 billion mark by 2025 [92]. It would
cause the wearable devices market to grow from 216 million
devices in 2019 to 614.3 million units in 2025 [93].
Wearables make use of a number of technologies including
cellular, Near Field Communication (NFC), Bluetooth, Wi-Fi,
GPS, ultra-wideband (UWB), Long Term Evolution (LTE) and
5G for information gathering, communication and localisation.
A typical wearable device can perform the contact tracing fea-
ture for COVID-19 by tracking the location of the user through
GPS tracker as well as proximity sensors utilising Bluetooth,
UWB radio and LTE/5G connectivity. When a user becomes
COVID-19 positive, they updates their status that prompts
alerts to others who have been in contact with them based on
proximity and location data history. The wearable devices can
also be used effectively to enforce the self-isolation/quarantine
through monitoring of geolocation of the user and raising
alarm when such a person moves out of their house. Figure 21
shows a possible working scenario of the wearable devices for
contact tracing. Use of multiple technologies makes wearables
quite versatile in terms of performance, range and accuracy.
Health data like heart rate, skin temperature, cough and
blood oxygen saturation collected from wearable devices can
also be effectively used to detect the onset and progres-
sion of illness caused by COVID-19 [94]. By leveraging
wearable technology either off-the shelf solutions like FitBit
or customized solutions (electronic bracelets equipped with
vital signal monitoring, geolocation sensor, proximity sensors
powered by Bluetooth, GPS), contact tracing can be enhanced
by connecting it to a mobile app such as StayHomeSafe [95].
Scripps Health, Stanford Medicine and Fitbit are collaborating
in a study to assess the ability of wearable devices to track,
trace and isolate COVID-19 patients [96].
Estimote has created a range of wearable devices called the
“Proof of Health” wearables for COVID-19 contact tracing at
the level of the local workplace [99], [97]. The device that can
be worn using a lanyard or like a wristwatch (Figure 22), has
passive GPS location tracking, Bluetooth and UWB proximity
sensors, a rechargeable battery and built-in LTE. A change
in the user’s health status, such as COVID-19 suspected or
confirmed, flags the alarm and alert the people who have been
in contact with them. This however requires use of Estimote’s
wearable devices by the whole work force in that facility.
The Proximity Trace device developed by Triax Technolo-
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Fig. 20: Example of contact network creation using two-mode network approach
Fig. 21: Use of wearables for contact tracing
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Fig. 22: Examples of wearables for contact tracing [97], [98]
gies, Inc., is affixed to a safety hat or worn on the body with
a lanyard alerts the user when they are too close to another
user. In case of a COVID-19-positive user, the company can
perform contact tracing and identify possible exposures using
historical data logged in passively by the user’s device [98].
Similar solutions are also offered by Blackline Safety Corp
[100]. A contact tracing App, Workforce that is compatible
with the wearable wrist bands for contact tracing and tracking
is developed by Ascent Solutions [101].
Wearable Bluetooth/GPS enabled wristbands have been
tested for contact tracing, enforcing the social distancing and
observing the lockdown during COVID-19 pandemic in coun-
tries including Bulgaria, South Korea, Hong Kong, Belgium,
Lichtenstein and India [102].
These wearable devices must be synced to their home
location through smartphone’s GPS and any active patients can
be tracked and made to remain in that location until cleared.
An alert is sent to the monitoring station if the wearer moves
further than 15 metres away from their phone. The location
and proximity data of such individuals can be mapped to
a centralized web-based dashboard as a warning mechanism
or can be coupled with centralized tracing applications like
TraceTogether [33].
V. ATTACKS
There are a range of attacks on contact tracing method. As
contact tracing is heavily reliant on the use of data science and
machine learning, it inherits the vulnerabilities of those areas.
Let us consider a systematic monitoring of people’s proximity,
which results in a classification mechanism depending on
that proximity if there is high probability for an infection.
A potential instance of the recorded interactions is a sample
that is classified using utility function f either as probably
infected or not infected. Let us assume that we have an input
space X = {xi} and of course an output space Y = {yi},
where xi is an instance of the interactions and yi is the output
of that instance determined by f , i.e. f(xi) = yi. We make the
assumption that our initial system has been trained using N
samples from the real world where we know the interactions
of people and how many of them were eventually infected.
Those samples form the training set S and it has derived the
system perception, denoted by yˆ. After the end of the training
phase, our designed system receives new samples from the real
world environment and classifies them. We are able to define
this as the run-time phase of our system. For every new event
xˆi, f gives a new output f(xˆi) = yˆi. We have the following
cases:
• If xˆi are probably infected and our system does not
recognize them as such, they are called false negatives
that cause a loss l to our system.
• If xˆi are probably infected and our system recognizes
them as such, they are called true positives. They might
also be not infected. In either case there is no loss to our
system.
• If xˆi are not infected and our system recognizes them
as probably infected, they are called false positives and
cause a loss λ to our system.
The attacker of the specific system wants to avoid being self
isolated because of their contact with infected people. The aim
of the attacker is to maximize the impact the attack has to the
system by maximizing |f(xˆi)−yi|. Consequently, a challenge
of the system that defends its functionality is to find a utility
function that minimizes the losses, measured as the distance
of f(xˆi) to the real output yi.
A. Attacks on Data Privacy
1) Membership Inference Attacks: An adversary is able to
perform a membership inference attack [103] by querying
the model and exploiting the returned confidence values to
distinguish if data was part of the training. In a contact tracing
application, the returned output to the users would include
if the person has been in contact with a COVID-19 patient,
alongside with a confidence score of this classification. An
adversary is able to exploit this information, with knowledge
extracted from public data sets, to identify if people’s data was
part of the ML training.
2) Model Inversion Attacks: In Model Inversion (MI) at-
tacks [104], [105], [106], the adversary’s goal is to reproduce
the sensitive training data. The threat model of MI attacks
involves access to the training model, as well as the confidence
scores that are returned as the output of it. In the contact
tracing App, the ML model should be hidden from the users,
since there is no need for them to access it.
3) Data Poisoning Attacks: The adversary can poison the
training data set. To accomplish their goal, they derive and
inject a point to decrease the classification accuracy [107],
[108], [109], [110], [111], [112]. This attack has the ability
to completely distort the classification function during its
training, thus allowing the attacker to divert the classification
of the system according to their taste. In a real-world scenario,
the attacker needs to have privileged access to a contact tracing
application, being a member of either the development or
the administration team. This scenario is rather unrealistic as
a single person would not be responsible for handling the
training data set without any supervision.
B. Attacks on Model Privacy
1) Evasion Attacks: The attacker can undertake an evasion
attack against classification during the testing phase, thus
producing a wrong system perception. In this case, the goal
of the adversary is to achieve misclassification of their data,
for example, remaining unnoticed. In a real-world scenario
with a contact tracing app, the attacker would want to confuse
the system about the interactions they had with other people.
18
TABLE II: Comparison of COVID-19 contact tracing enabling technologies
Technology Pros Cons Users
GPS
• Availability of real-time location in-
formation.
• Locating users in real-time who con-
tracted the virus.
• Identifying the demand and need for
healthcare in an area.
• Identify virus hot-spots with Geo-
data.
• Local information and awareness for
patients, carers.
• Enabling care professionals to con-
tinue the upmost service in care.
• High storage and computational re-
quirements.
• Possible issues with indoor localisa-
tion.
• Social fears of being tracked and the
lack of trust in the use of person-
al/health.
Everyone
Bluetooth
• Wide availability.
• Low power requirements.
• List of all devices that have “made
contact” is readily available.
• Reduced requirement for storage and
computational resources.
• Inaccuracy of proximity approxima-
tion.
• 5-10 meters scanning range causing
false positives.
• Real-time location information is not
available.
• Requires a higher level of program-
ming to make sure the Bluetooth con-
nectivity is enabled and responsive to
the requirements of the application.
Everyone
Bluetooth plus UHF
RFID
• Able to track the contacts with accu-
racy and double check.
• Can track the belongings and items in
use of the patient.
• Tagging items and deploying RFID
readers with phase RSSI and phase
reading will incur cost.
Everyone
WiFi router tracing
• Widely available worldwide as han-
dling 60% of the internet traffic.
• Wide range of different types of exist-
ing WiFi routers can be readily used
with no extra hardware.
• Relatively low accuracy. Hybrid tech-
niques such as using the built-in ac-
celerometer and gyroscope with WiFi
can improve the accuracy.
Everyone
Mobile network trac-
ing
• No app installation is required.
• Transparent to the user.
• Larger public access, who, if desired,
could opt-out of the programme.
• List of devices that have made contact
is not available.
• Only high-level localisation informa-
tion is available.
• Participation of network operators is
required to increase coverage.
Mobile Op-
erators
UWB 5G • High accuracy. • Not yet fully operational. Everyone
Crowd sourcing of so-
cial media and track-
ing financial transac-
tions
• A pre-outbreak pattern can be iden-
tified indicating the areas where the
virus could strike next.
• Could generating near-real-time infor-
mation for public health officials that
could help tracking its spread.
• Privacy is a major concern as the ac-
curacy of such models depends on the
location information and other data
sources including financial transaction
information.
Government
entities
Wearable
devices using
Bleutooth/GPS/WiFi
• Suitable for high traffic and dense
areas including indoors, malls, homes.
• Enables tracking as well as geofenc-
ing the infected patients.
• Allows remote tracking of quaran-
tined patients.
• Increased coverage and reliability.
• No need of a smartphone, hence cost
effective.
• Requires a customized wearable de-
vice.
• Requires the user to have the app
running at all times.
• Can generate false positives as range
is higher than 1.5 meter.
Everyone
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Moreover, the attacker can compromise the targeted system by
being spotted out as potentially infected. This can be easily
achieved by using many different phones in too many different
locations. There was an incident where a person caused an
artificial traffic jam on Google maps using a wagon full of
Phones [113]. This incident changed the perception of the
system about road traffic, forcing Google maps to assume that
there was a traffic jam when it was not busy.
2) Model Extraction Attacks: The adversary in Model Ex-
traction attacks [114] is trying to reconstruct a ML model
that is similar to the original, by identifying the decision
boundaries of it. The attackers aim to have complete access to
a ML model that behaves similarly with the original, in order
to perform an attack on Data Privacy, as seen in Section V-A.
3) Model Poisoning Attacks: Model Poisoning attacks are
quite similar to the Data Poisoning attacks (discussed in
Section V-A3) as an adversary injects “hidden” poisons to
the training model in order to behave maliciously only on
their trigger [115], [116]. However, Model Poisoning attacks,
opposed to Data Poisoning attacks, do not require access to
the ML training procedure, and elaborate scenarios where the
ML model is sent to the users, such as Federated Learning
[117], [118], [119], [120]. In the contact tracing scenario,
the ML model can be sent to the users for training, and
then to protect the privacy of the users, a secure aggregation
technique collects and aggregates all the trained models, before
returning it to the ML coordinators. That enables the Model
Poisoning threat possibility, since a malicious user can poison
the received model before sending it back, and since the secure
aggregation is in place, the ML coordinators can not identify
that the final trained model is being poisoned.
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The discussion on user and contact tracing opens up a whole
lot of questions, and the most fundamental of these is that
we do not actually have any real infrastructure to implement
privacy-preserving methods. It is likely that a COVID-19 App
would be a pin-point App where the data gathered for location
and contact tracking could be easily abused. Furthermore, in
the absence of a universally acceptable standard, it would have
limited scope outside a country’s borders. Our major problem
is that we have built data infrastructures that mirror those from
the 1980s where we care little about the core rights of the
data we gather. Once captured, the owner becomes the entity
who captured the data, and without the trustworthiness of the
transactions involved, we leave it open to abuse for malicious
activities.
A. Who is Trent?
We often trust our health authorities a great deal more than
we trust our governments. If the data goes to clinical staff for
analysis, we perhaps find that more acceptable than someone
in law enforcement. Thus, the fundamental question in the
whole system is how we can make sure that Trent is someone
trusted. This could be a trusted entity who handles the data
on behalf of the citizen (and preserves their privacy on their
behalf) or a health authority that Alice trusts? It is unlikely that
we should trust anyone other than health authorities, and also
we need to make sure that the data gathered is only kept for
the required amount of time. Any tracing of contacts should
not be kept for longer than it is required, it should be used
only for the clinical purposes and only provided to trusted
health professionals (Figure 23).
B. Where is Carol?
There are no trusted mechanisms to integrate a formal test
for COVID-19. we therefore bring in Carol the Tester. Carol
the Tester would be able to define a state of testing: Positive,
Clear, and Suspected, and will have followed a scientific
process to provide Alice’s COVID-19 status.
C. What is Carol’s Attestation?
We don’t want the government to control testing, making
availability of a trusted network of testers — from our own
country and from other trusted places, eminent. Thus, we need
a trusted way for a number of testers to sign the attestation
that Alice has COVID-19, or when she has been identified to
be negative. A new attestation will revoke a previous one. So,
will this attestation be in the form of passporting system with
digital verification allowing Alice to carry a digital passport of
being free from COVID-19, and that can be passed to others?
D. Clear Role for Trent
Overall, Trent must be the health authority and not the
government. Trent must be the one who marks the status of
Alice as: Clear, Suspected, Not Known, and Positive. In this
way, Trent is responsible for defining the status of Alice and
the tracking will only happen when there is a positive status
applied to her.
E. Trent Must be the Health Authority
Border control, and which countries/testers do you trust?
The basic flaw of having just one health authority involved
is that there needs to be a trust between health authorities in
different countries. In this way, we can trace over borders,
when the travel reopens. A trust network for Carol in each
country needs to be defined along with the definition of
attestation process so that it can be shown at borders. Countries
thus will define the testing trust network, where Carol’s testing
is acceptable cross-border.
F. There is No Real Integration of Identities
How we are going to properly identify Bob, Trent or Alice?
With having a private key signing for Alice and Trent, there is
no real way of knowing that Alice is Alice and Trent is Trent.
Thus, we need someone for each core identity to be certified
for the things they are signing. This might include the health
authority to self-certify.
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Fig. 23: Who is Trent?
G. There is No Clear Mechanism for Alice’s Consent
A fundamental flaw is the consent mechanisms that Alice
must give to Trent in order to flip her current COVID-19
statement, especially in the changing it to a positive state.
While Trent may have the rights to record Alice as being
positive, he may need Alice’s consent as to whether she is
okay with her COVID-19 state being broadcast to others.
Normally when an App is installed on a mobile device,
the user should be alerted to the privacy implications of the
use of their personal data and would then need to give their
consent before proceeding. The consent would in this instance
cover the transmission of personal data to health authorities or
other official bodies. Under the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) it could be argued that vital interests of
individuals would be an alternative legal basis for gathering
and sharing this personal data [121]. This would apply to life-
or-death situation and this could be difficult to argue solely on
the basis that there is a possibility of death following exposure
to an infected individual. The other legal basis for processing
personal data would be public interest – and this might be
more easily justified on the basis that protecting public health
is in the public interest. Following GDPR principles will be
particularly important as the UK is likely to continue to be
subject to EU law during the pandemic.
H. Long Term Data Retention
The UK’s Data Protection Act 2018 allows for personal data
to be kept for research purposes so long as reasonable steps are
taken to protect individual identity [122]. Pseudonymisation
may offer some protection, but is not a guarantee that privacy
will be preserved. For instance, the data could be combined
with published data sets such as electoral registers to identify
individuals.
I. Lack of Incentive for Uptake
To make the App a success, there should be strong in-
centives for uptake. It may not be sufficient to appeal to
public-spirited attitudes when there is a strong disincentive
of increased personal restrictions. If an individual receives an
alert that they have been in close proximity to a suspected
infected individual, they are advised to self-isolate. This will
depend on the criteria that are applied to different levels of
alerting, the accuracy of the proximity measures and the degree
of self-reporting. It is possible that incentives such as legal
sanction and law enforcement are more likely to work in
authoritarian states, whereas social pressure might work better
in mono-cultural conformist societies. For a pluralistic and
democratically accountable society offering privileges such as
access to travel or greater freedom of movement might be
better motivators.
J. Poor Data Quality
Data quality will affect the contact tracing approach in
several ways: Where it depends on self-reporting of COVID-
19 symptoms, not everyone will do so. Will the authorities act
on self-reporting in order to respond rapidly, or wait for the
outcome of COVID-19 tests to confirm the self diagnosis? The
follow-up tests are not completely accurate and have varying
levels of type 1 and type 2 errors. The potential emergence of
a new, more virulent mutant strain of COVID-19 may affect
the criteria used to assess risk (potential to transmit in less
time or at an increased distance, for instance) [123].
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K. No Binding of Data
There is no method which truly binds the capture of contact
data to the entities involved in a trusted way. The only thing it
does is to mask Alice until she is proven to have COVID-19,
after which her data can be revealed to others without any
restrictions.
L. There’s No Signing Involved
A fundamental trait of the modern world is that we introduce
proper digital signing. As a minimum, we should see key pairs
being created for devices and entities where IDs and tracking
are signed by private keys, and checked for the correctness of
the signer. There are many trusted signing methods which can
be used to anonymise the signer.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have identified a number of existing technologies includ-
ing GPS, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, RFID, wearable devices and social
media fingerprints that can effectively provide the tracks of a
COVID-19 patient. The potential contacts/proximity users can
efficiently be identified and notified of the threat and hence,
advice to self-isolate. Table II summarises their key benefits
along with the disadvantages.
The Bluetooth approach, being pursued at various stages by
governments across Europe and Latin America, as well as in
Australia and many Asia nations, requires a majority of people
in a geographic area to adopt it for it to be effective. These
apps are also considered to be interfering with vital signs
monitoring applications such as diabetes monitoring [124].
Some countries, including South Korea and Israel, are using
high-tech methods of contact tracing that involve tracking
peoples’ location via phone networks. But such centralized,
surveillance-based approaches are viewed as invasive and
unacceptable in many countries for privacy reasons.
The Bluetooth-based Apps are also more privacy-friendly
than tracking techniques that use GPS or cellphone data.
They use Bluetooth to broadcast and receive an encrypted,
pseudonymous signal from nearby phones and create a log of
interactions that remain on the phone, so users’ names and
numbers are not disclosed. Social Media approach also has
good potential but is marred by authentication restrictions.
Wearables appear to be a dynamic and effective solution as
have the capability to make use of multiple technologies with
improved efficiency and higher accuracy.
The main issues that surround these enablers of a potential
contact tracing application include privacy concerns, security
loopholes, lack of testing and part use of the smartphones.
The privacy concerns need to be eradicated through GDPR
compliance, transparent development of the app and data usage
and reassurance about the temporary nature of the surveillance.
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